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Introduction
A new wave of agricultural commercialisation is being promoted across Africa’s 
eastern seaboard, by a broad range of influential actors – from international 
corporations to domestic political and business elites. Growth corridors, linking 
infrastructure development, mining and agriculture for export, are central to this, 
and are generating a new spatial politics as formerly remote borders and hinterlands 
are expected to be transformed through foreign investment and aid projects.
In our APRA study, which has been based on work in Kenya, Mozambique and 
Tanzania, we have been asking: what actually happens on the ground, even when 
corridors as originally planned are slow to materialise? Do the grand visions play out 
as expected? Who is involved and who loses out?
Three contrasting cases
The following case studies from three countries each explore key ‘political economy’1 
themes from different angles: 
 ● Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, Kenya 
focuses on what happens as the promises of corridor development unfold in 
the coastal region of Lamu. This research also examines the diverse ‘economies 
of anticipation’ that are articulated by different groups – from farmers to civil 
society groups to government officials – as the terms of inclusion are negotiated 
even in advance of any big investments.
 ● Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) focuses on 
contestations – especially over land and market opportunities – and the types of 
resistance and agreement that are reached between interest groups, including 
state–capital alliances and diverse groups of local people on the ground. 
1 This APRA briefing paper is based on findings presented in the APRA working paper, Chome, N., 
Goncalves, E., Scoones, I., Sulle, E. (2019) The Political Economy of Agricultural Growth Corridors in Eastern 
Africa. Future Agricultures Consortium.
Key messages
 ● Policy appraisal must include political economy 
analysis to explore potential winners and losers.
 ● Corridor design – and the associated business 
models promoting agricultural investment – 
make a big difference. Opportunities for a more 
networked organisation, avoiding the limitations 
of a ‘tunnel’ design, need to be explored, 
especially around the design of transport 
infrastructure that can benefit local economies.
 ● Inclusion and exclusion terms in corridors are 
mediated through a range of local institutional 
and political processes. For example, land 
speculation and the revitalisation of older 
conflicts over resources may occur as a result of 
corridor development. Benefits may be unevenly 
shared in already unequal societies, with women 
and poorer households missing out. 
 ● Processes for negotiating corridor outcomes 
require the mobilisation of less empowered 
actors – including women and poorer people – 
and their organisation around clear guidelines 
that ensure terms of incorporation into corridor 
investments are not disadvantageous.
 ● Support for legal literacy and advocacy, as 
well as the organisation of disadvantaged 
groups, will help people to be able to articulate 
demands. This requires building on local 
organisations and networks to help counter the 
power of appropriation of local elites in alliance 
with the state and investment capital.
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 ● Nacala and Beira corridors, Mozambique examines the 
political economies of creating corridors through the everyday 
practice of extension agents, NGO officers and government 
officials. ‘Acts of demonstration’, such as projects, shows and 
visits, generate a visibility for new corridor activity.
Emphasising the diverse politics and practices of corridor-making 
– and the complex interactions between states, capital and local 
communities – all three cases focus attention on the classic 
questions of political economy:  who owns what, who gains what, 
and what they do with it? 
The main focus of the APRA corridors studies is on the processes of 
differentiation that result, identifying the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This, 
in turn, points to a new dynamic of accumulation resulting from 
corridors, as new forms of capital intervene (or are expected to) in 
previously marginal agrarian and pastoral settings.
Case study: Lamu port, Kenya
The LAPSSET Corridor Project is Eastern Africa’s largest and most 
ambitious infrastructure project, bringing together Kenya, Ethiopia 
and South Sudan. Several proposed LAPSSET infrastructure 
components – including a 32-berth port, an airport, a standard-
gauge railway and an oil pipeline – will come together in Kenya’s 
coastal county of Lamu, with that county’s population alone 
expected to increase ten-fold, to just over one million residents. 
The research shows how Lamu’s current residents are responding 
to the prospect of large-scale development through ‘economies of 
anticipation’. In this way, people are not only negotiating the terms 
of inclusion in advance of any huge investments, but they are also 
creating new, and/or entrenching old networks of patronage and 
mobilisation so as to secure a place in the anticipated prosperous 
future of the corridor.
For Lamu’s indigenous Bajuni community, the prospect of future 
population growth as migrants move into the area in search of 
employment is generating a nervous politics of belonging, driven by 
fears of potential marginalisation. “We will not be able to vote into 
office our own [Bajuni] people,” explained a local politician.
Speculation over the future of land has also been brought to the 
fore through the planned LAPSSET developments. An attack by 
Al-Shabaab-linked gunmen in 2014 - where close to 90 people 
were killed on the mainland areas of Lamu - was linked by the 
government to rumours (and real concern) of a ‘Lamu land grab’. 
This lead to the government revoking formal titles that had been 
issued to 22 companies between 2011 and 2012, when the LAPSSET 
agenda was beginning to take shape. Some of the land included 
plots where 12 of the proposed 32 berths of the new port would be 
built. Since 2016, Kenya’s government has reallocated this land as 
individually-owned plots to local residents, with some reserved for 
LAPSSET activities.
The case of LAPSSET in Lamu provides valuable insight into local 
reactions to large-scale infrastructure projects in previously 
marginalised rural regions. The anticipation that this large-scale 
infrastructure project has generated on the ground suggests that 
local reactions can sometimes be complex and varied, separate 
from analyses that have emphasised the dispossession of rural 
communities and the expansion of bureaucratic power as the 
main outcomes. Instead, LAPSSET is continuously being debated, 
anticipated and negotiated by multiple actors with diverse interests, 
and with increasingly varied and unpredictable consequences. 
Case study: The outgrower model in Tanzania
SAGCOT was launched in 2010, as a public-private partnership which 
aims to produce “inclusive, commercially successful agribusinesses 
that will benefit the region’s small-scale farmers.”  The corridor covers 
approximately one-third of Tanzania’s mainland – extending north 
and south of the central rail, road and power ‘backbone’, which runs 
from Dar es Salaam to the northern areas of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Malawi and Zambia.
The corridor’s planners (mainly state bureaucrats with support 
from external consultants and private sector) have promoted an 
‘outgrower’ farming model, as a purportedly inclusive model for 
commercialised agriculture. For example, the SAGCOT blueprint 
cites the outgrowing scheme operated by the Kilombero Sugar 
Company (KSC) as the model to replicate. KSC began as a private 
company in the 1960s before being nationalised in 1967 – since 
then, the government operated the company in partnership with 
outgrowers until it was once again privatised. Now largely owned by 
Associated British Foods Plc., KSC maintains its working relationship 
with outgrowers.
The outgrower model benefits some – predominantly wealthier 
farmers – and the production of sugar is crucial for the local and 
national economy. However, estates offer few and often poor 
quality job opportunities, as they generally depend on migrants and 
seasonal workers. 
And, while outgrowing offers some tangible backward and forward 
linkages supporting the local and national economy, a lack of 
comprehensive policy, legal and institutional frameworks governing 
outgrower schemes limit opportunities for all participating farmers. 
As a result, this partnership between the company and outgrowers 
provide greater benefits to investors and elites, and can have 
significant negative implications for marginalised land users, such as 
pastoralists and poor outgrowers.
Without checks and balances, the rushed implementation of 
SAGCOT could have disastrous implications for many rural 
communities. The state body established to facilitate development 
of the Rufiji Basin, for example, continues to lobby communities to 
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allocate land for large-scale investments in the corridor. However, 
not all communities have consented to requests to conduct land-
use planning.
Case study: Agricultural commercialisation in Mozambique
Along the Beira and Nacala corridors, in addition to the renovation of 
the main roads and railways connecting the ports to the hinterland, 
agricultural commercialisation infrastructure projects have been 
undertaken. Through a number of different arrangements – such as 
catalytic funds, international private investments or NGO-funded 
agribusiness projects – new agribusinesses have taken off and 
traditional cash crops such as cashew nuts, tobacco and sugar are 
being revitalised.
Over the past 3 years, Nhamatanda district along the Beira corridor 
has witnessed the construction of important commercialisation 
infrastructure. A processing plant in Tica – composed of three 
1000 t silos, two 300 t transitory silos and two store houses – was 
built in 2015. However, the grain silos are prohibitively expensive 
for smallholders, who are often unable to meet the minimum 
requirement of 5 t of produce to have access to the silos. The 
storehouses also follow storage procedures, including fumigation, 
which may mean that stored produce may not be readily available in 
case of need.
So far, the impacts of infrastructural investments along the corridors 
in Mozambique are mixed on the ground and smallholders in Nacala 
and Beira corridor areas are not even close to feeling the positive 
effects in terms of improvement of their livelihoods as a result of 
increasing production and productivity. Access to new infrastructure 
for agricultural commercialisation is selective. With large companies 
and investors primarily benefiting, the possibilities for Mozambique 
to unlock its agricultural potential along the so-called agricultural 
corridors remains limited. Smallholders therefore continue to 
wait for ‘the market’ in the form of reliable market information, 
appropriate warehouses and storage infrastructure and, most 
importantly, feeder roads that can connect areas of high agricultural 
potential to the main corridor roads and railway lines.
Processes of corridor-making: emerging 
findings
Some reflections on the implications of our findings for debates 
about the development of commercial agriculture in eastern Africa 
include:
 ● The form and design of the corridor matters. We contrast a 
linear, ‘tunnel’ model – involving a limited set of actors usually 
involved in enclave-based export production – with a more 
informal ‘network’ model that allows a wider range of actors to 
be included. 
 ● Business configurations of investments are important. Large 
investments in agriculture in the form of centrally-managed 
estates or plantations may offer limited opportunity for positive 
‘spill-over’ or ‘linkage’ effects in the wider economy, especially 
if labour is hired from outside the region, as is often the case. 
By contrast, investments that explicitly include an outgrower 
element – whereby smallholder farmers produce on contract for 
a core estate or processing plant – offer potentials for different 
production relations, depending on the terms of incorporation.
 ● Local context and negotiations alter plans. Neither a state-
driven modernist plan nor enclave capitalism results. Local 
contexts and political negotiations instead generate many 
hybrid forms, as different visions compete and converge. 
State plans for corridor commercialisation – often presented 
as a vision of an extractivist ‘tunnel’, with limited connections 
to wider economies – frequently fall apart.  The realities of 
rural Africa on the margins intervene, transforming economic 
prospects and forcing projects to morph into a new project 
more closely aligned with local capital interests.
 ● Winners and losers. At the local level, alliances between 
local elites, investment capital and the state results in new 
patterns of differentiation, creating winners and losers. 
Ethnic politics is often central, as claims over resources are 
contested between indigenous groups and a state promoting a 
national development project. Those able to benefit from new 
investments – such as through outgrower schemes – are often 
those who are already better off, with corridors reinforcing 
existing patterns of inequality.
 ● Agricultural corridors as ‘demonstration fields’. In the past 
two decades, various government-promoted and donor-funded 
agricultural programmes and projects have been undertaken 
along corridors but few live up to the expectation of unlocking 
the agricultural potential of these regions. Agricultural corridors 
are then the result of spatial and temporarily dispersed 
interventions by networks of actors – local and external – that 
reproduce themselves by proclaiming agricultural development 
during agricultural fairs and conferences, the unveiling of 
agriculture-related infrastructures and generalisations from 
isolated cases of success. To different degrees, smallholders, 
local government, NGOs, private investors and international 
donors all play a role in the constitution of agricultural corridors 
as ‘demonstration fields’.
 ● Diverse pathways of commercialisation emerge. Agricultural 
initiatives range from the establishment of estates/plantations, 
to the creation of block farms and cooperative groups, 
to contract farming arrangements – or emerge through 
infrastructure development, including roads and rail that 
change market opportunities and relations. However, outcomes 
are not necessarily as planned, as actors get involved, new 
networks are created and new opportunities arise. 
© Lidia Cabral
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Implications for policy and practice
Practical and policy implications differ greatly by context. Below we 
offer a generic set of implications for agricultural growth corridors in 
eastern Africa based on our findings:
 ● Policy appraisal must include political economy analysis 
to explore the potential winners and losers. External 
capital/infrastructure investment mobilises local interests, 
including local capital and the state, creating new patterns 
of differentiation. This means appraisal must go beyond 
the standard economic assessment to a wider social and 
political analysis.
 ● Corridor design – and the associated business models 
promoting agricultural investment – make a big difference. 
Opportunities for a more networked organisation, avoiding the 
limitations of a ‘tunnel’ design, need to be explored, especially 
around the design of transport infrastructure that can benefit 
local economies.
 ● Inclusion and exclusion terms in corridors are mediated 
through a range of local institutional and political processes. 
For example, land speculation and the revitalisation of older 
conflicts over resources may occur as a result of corridor 
development. Benefits may be unevenly shared in already 
unequal societies, with women and poorer households 
missing out. 
 ● Processes for negotiating corridor outcomes require the 
mobilisation of less empowered actors – including women 
and poorer people – and their organisation around clear 
guidelines – such as those within the FAO Voluntary Guidelines 
on land tenure – that ensure terms of incorporation into 
corridor investments are not disadvantageous.
 ● Support for legal literacy and advocacy, as well as the 
organisation of disadvantaged groups, will help people to 
be able to articulate demands. This requires building on 
local organisations and networks to help counter the power 
of appropriation of local elites in alliance with the state and 
investment capital.
As state-capital alliances forge grand visions for development 
corridors across Africa’s eastern seaboard, the processes of corridor-
making will come under greater scrutiny. The issues raised by our 
research suggest the need to focus on a more inclusive, ‘networked’ 
form of corridor, avoiding the dangers of extractive ‘tunnel’ visions 
designed for extraction. 
If corridors are to benefit the majority, through investments in 
infrastructure, new technologies and markets, then attention to 
political economy is vital, whether in relation to wider structural 
political interests or practical engagements on the ground.
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